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Abstract
Amartya Sen, in his most recent book Development as Freedom, argues
that expansion of human freedom should both be viewed as the primary end
and the principle means of development. This paper provides an overview
and a critical scrutiny of the Senian perspective from the point of view of an
economist. First, I discuss to what extent Sen’s normative theory of develop-
ment justifies a particular focus on inequality and poverty. Second, I look at
Sen’s perspective on democratic reasoning as the constructive vehicle for val-
uational exercises, and in particular how this perspective fits with the recent
human development framework of UNDP. Third, I discuss the relevance of
markets within the freedom approach, and fourth I review some of the most
important empirical interconnections between different freedoms studied by
Sen.
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views expressed in the paper.
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1 Introduction
We all think of development as the movement towards a better and more just society.
But what does this really mean? In order to elaborate on such a question, we need to
approach fundamental issues within moral and political philosophy. What is good
for a person? What is a good society? However, many people think that such a
discussion is a mistake, at least if we want to contribute to development in the real
world. They believe that all important practical problems of development are related
to the choice of means in order to attain well-established aims, and that any further
elaboration on the aims of development is futile for practical purposes.
Amartya Sen’s book Development as Freedom (Sen 1999a) shows that this view
is mistaken.1 Sen presents an impressive blend of philosophical, economic and prac-
tical reasoning that once and for all should demonstrate how further understanding
of the aims of development can enrich our practical debate on the appropriate means
of development. Sen organizes the discussion on how to understand and deal with
(among other things) poverty, famines, population growth, unemployment, and gen-
der inequality around a particular philosophical position, which is that the aim of
development is to expand human freedom. And he illustrates how this position dif-
fers from standard views on development, and why these differences matter in real
life.
Even though one might disagree with some aspects of Sen’s perspective, we
should all embrace the general lesson of this book: Avoid slogans and narrow inter-
pretations in any debate on development issues. Unfortunately, one sometimes gets
the feeling that this general lesson is not applied by all when interpreting and dis-
cussing Sen’s ideas and suggestions. In particular, many academics and practitioners
seem to consider Sen as the economist that saved the world from economics, where
it is assumed that economics is not at all about poverty, inequality, justice, and
fairness. That is of course wrong. The economic profession has always considered
distributive issues of greatest importance, as illustrated by the following quote from
one of the grandfathers of economics.
1The book is based on five lectures given at the World Bank during the fall of 1996 and spring of
1997. Many of the topics discussed in this book have been extensively studied by Sen in a number
of other books and articles, as indicated in the footnotes of the book. For further references, see
also Basu, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1995), who provide bibliographical data of Sen’s work until
1993.
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‘I would add one word for any student beginning economic study who
may be discouraged by the severity of the effort which the study...seems
to require of him. The complicated analyses which economists endeav-
our to carry through are not mere gymnastic. They are instruments for
the bettering of human life. The misery and squalor that surround us,
the injurious luxury of some wealthy families, the terrible uncertainty
overshadowing many families of the poor - these are the evils to plain to
be ignored. By the knowledge that our science seeks it is possible that
they may be restrained. Out of the darkness light! To search for it is the
task, to find it perhaps the prize, which the “dismal science of Political
Economy” offers those who face its discipline’ (Pigou, 1928, p. vii).
This is also underlined by Sen, who argues that “economists as a group cannot be
accused of neglecting inequality as a subject” (Sen, 1999a, p. 107).2 Certainly, Sen
has contributed enormously to this work within economics, by attracting attention
to important problems of injustice and by broadening the framework of welfare
economics. But we should apply his perspective with care. And in the spirit of Sen’s
own work, the aim of this paper is to provide a balanced discussion of his perspective
on development. What is really the implication of viewing “[e]xpansion of freedom
both as the primary end and as the principal means of development” (p. xii)? In
Section 2, I provide a brief outline of Sen’s freedom approach, whereas in Section
3 I discuss the implications of viewing expansion of freedom as the primary end of
development. My main message in the first part of this section is that Sen’s normative
theory does not necessarily justify a particular focus on inequality and poverty in
the development process. Sen has chosen to apply his framework to these problems,
but that is not the same as providing a justification for a poverty- or inequality-
orientated perspective. According to Sen’s own view, any such justification has to
be based on democratic reasoning, and I provide a discussion of this idea and how it
relates to the human development approach of UNDP in the second part of Section
3. In Section 4, I discuss the relevance of markets within the freedom approach
and provide a review of Sen’s claim that the expansion of individual freedom is the
principal means of development. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2In the rest of the paper, I will only provide the page references if the quotation or reference is
from Development as Freedom.
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2 The freedom approach
The freedom approach of Sen is coined in the language of capabilities and function-
ings.3
‘The concept of “functioning”, which has distinctly Aristotelian roots,
reflects the various things a person may value doing or being. The valued
functionings may vary from elementary ones, such as being adequately
nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very complex activ-
ities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of the
community and having self-respect.
A person’s “capability” refers to the alternative combinations of func-
tionings that are all feasible for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind
of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning
combinations’ (p. 75).
According to Sen, there are three main arguments for adopting this framework
when evaluating development processes. First, it attracts attention to the intrinsi-
cally important aspects in the life of people, contrary to the conventional income
approach (or any other resource-based framework). Second, it captures the multi-
dimensional nature of the ends of development, contrary to the utility framework of
economists (which Sen considers to be a one-track approach to an evaluation of the
well-being of a person). And third, it provides a reasonable representation of peo-
ple’s substantive freedom, to wit the freedom to achieve alternative combinations of
things a person may value doing or being. Let us consider each of these arguments
in some more detail.
Income can certainly be very important as means to achieving intrinsically valu-
able functionings, but the relation between economic wealth and individual freedom
is neither exclusive nor uniform (p. 14). There are significant influences on our lives
other than economic wealth, and the impact of economic wealth varies with other
influences. Hence, even though income-related variables will be of interest in a prac-
tical debate, there is a need for spelling out and focusing on the reasons for wanting
economic wealth.
3These concepts were first introduced in Sen (1980). See Robeyns (2000) for an extensive
overview of Sen’s writing on this topic.
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Sen believes that the framework of functionings and capabilities captures these
reasons more accurately than the standard approach within welfare economics. Sen
rejects the traditional utilitarian ethics taking happiness as the point of departure
for two reasons. First, he finds it a too narrow interpretation of well-being. Happiness
does not alone constitute a person’s being, and thus there is a need for taking into
account other valuable functionings. Moreover, he questions the importance of an
aspect of a person’s life that is easily swayed by adaptive attitudes.
‘Our desires and pleasure-taking abilities adjust to circumstances, es-
pecially to make life bearable in adverse situations. The utility calculus
can be deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived: for example,
the usual underdogs in stratified societies, perennially oppressed minori-
ties in intolerant communities, traditionally precarious sharecroppers liv-
ing in a world of uncertainty, routinely overworked sweatshop employees
in exploitative arrangements, hopelessly subdued housewives in severely
sexist cultures. The deprived people tend to come to terms with their
deprivation because of the sheer necessity of survival, and they may, as a
result, lack the courage to demand radical change, and may even adjust
their desires and expectations to what they unambitously see as feasible.
The mental metric of pleasures or desire is just to malleable to be a firm
guide to deprivation and disadvantage’ (pp. 62-63).
However, the modern interpretation of utility among economists is that utility
is a representation of individual preferences and not a measure of happiness. And
we might wonder whether this approach faces the same problems as the hedonistic
version of utilitarianism. In one respect, it does. Our preferences are also swayed by
adaptive attitudes, and hence we might on some occasions wonder whether people’s
preferences ought to be a firm guide for evaluative purposes. I guess most people
accept that there are certain cases where we should overrule an individual’s prefer-
ences, but I will not pursue the hard question about where to draw the line. I should
rather like to point to the fact that the modern interpretation of utility might avoid
the criticism of being a one-track approach to well-being. In particular, if we define
individual preferences in the functioning space, then the utility framework meets
Sen’s demand for a broad approach to our understanding of well-being. The only
thing we add to the Senian approach by adopting the utility framework is then an
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understanding of how to evaluate different bundles of functionings when making
intrapersonal evaluations of well-being.
However, Sen’s idea of substantive freedom is not captured by any combination
of functionings actually achieved by a person, but by the alternative combinations
of functionings that are all feasible for a person to achieve. This is the basic idea of
the capability approach, and the guiding principle for Sen in his practical analysis of
the development process. In this discussion, he consider five types of such freedoms.
‘Political freedoms...include the political entitlements associated
with democracies in the broadest sense...Economic facilities refer to
the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize eco-
nomic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or
exchange...Social opportunities refer to the arrangements that society
makes for education, health care and so on...Transparency guarantees
deal with the need for openness that people can expect: the freedom to
deal with one another under disclosure and lucidity...The domain of pro-
tective security (my emphasis) includes fixed institutional arrangements
such as unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the
indigent as well as ad hoc arrangements such as famine relief or emer-
gency public employment to generate income for destitutes (pp. 38-40).’
We will review Sen’s discussion of these freedoms as principal means of develop-
ment in Section 4, but let us first turn to a further discussion of the implications of
viewing individual freedom as the end of development.
3 Individual freedom as the end of development
The evaluation of any process of development would have to take place at two levels
- the individual and the aggregate.4 We have to make clear whether the process
has contributed to the improvement in the lives of people (the individual level), and
how to aggregate the claims of different individuals (the aggregate level). If there
is no conflict between people, we have a trivial problem of evaluation. Economists
4In this discussion, I do not take into account how to deal with nonhuman aspects of develop-
ment.
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would endorse such a process with reference to the Pareto principle. But the Pareto
principle is defined in the space of preference satisfaction, and hence it is not an
appropriate condition to appeal to within the Senian framework.
A structurally equivalent condition, however, can be stated in the language of
individual freedom, to wit by saying that society A should be considered better than
society B if everyone has more freedom in A than B, and such a principle can be
used to justify a harmonious process of development.5 Most people would probably
endorse some version of this principle (though there are exceptions discussed in
Tungodden (2001)), but I guess many will question the practical relevance of it. In
general, there are gainers and losers of different development policies, and thus there
is a need for a justifiable resolution of the distributive conflict.
How might Sen’s capability approach assist us on this fundamental issue? Is it
possible to use his theory to justify a particular focus on the problem of poverty or
distributive problems more generally, as many people seem to think? Immediately,
it is not obvious how that should be done. Sen’s theory is mainly concerned with the
individual level of analysis (that is, with the choice of evaluative space), and thus
leaves open the question about how to deal with distributive conflicts. His argument
is that individual claims are to be assessed in terms of the freedoms they actually
enjoy to choose the lives that they have reason to value (p. 74), which does not say
anything about the relative importance of capability poverty and inequality in an
overall evaluation of a distributive conflict. And as stressed by Sen (1982, p. 369)
himself, the capability approach can be used in many different ways, including a
way similar to utilitarianism (which would not assign any particular importance to
the alleviation of capability poverty and inequality).
The discussion in Development as Freedom might on some occasions be confusing
in this respect. Sen often chooses to contrast the capability approach with a focus
on economic growth (see for example pp. 36-37, p. 150, p. 285, and pp. 290-291),
and this might to some readers give the impression that there is a choice to make
between the distributive insensitive income approach and the distributive sensitive
capability approach. This is of course wrong and certainly not Sen’s message (see p.
5Broome (1991) introduced a general version of this principle, coined the Principle of Personal
Good, saying that society A should be considered better than society B if everyone is better off in
A than B according to the appropriate definition of well-being (which in the Senian context is the
capability framework)..
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39). Sen has made prominent contributions to income poverty measurement (Sen,
1976) and income inequality measurement (Sen, 1973), and such measures can easily
be included in an overall distributive sensitive income approach. Actually, according
to Sen (1992, p. 146), the income approach can be made too distributive sensitive,
if we adopt the Rawlsian perspective (within the income space) and only focuses
on the interests of the worst off.6 Hence, the reason for moving beyond the income
approach is not to develop a more distributive sensitive conception of development,
but to establish a normative framework that deals with the aspects of people’s lives
that are of intrinsic value. Sen’s claim is that functionings are constitutive of a
person’s being (Sen, 1992, p. 39), and it is on this basis he suggests the move from
the income space to the capability space.7
However, there is a motivational link between the capability approach and a
particular focus on the problem of poverty (see pp. 91-92). We do not care about
the poor because they lack income per se but because they are unable to do and be
certain basic things of intrinsic value (like unable to move around, meet nutritional
requirements, be sheltered, clothed, educated, and so on). And most people consider
the lack of these basic functionings as having particular urgency in an evaluation
of the development process. In that sense, by clarifying a framework that captures
the aspects of a person’s situation underlying our particular concern for the poor,
the capability approach provides a needed motivational basis for a focus on poverty
when solving distributive conflicts. But notice that this is not the same as providing
a justification for a focus on poverty in the development process. This job cannot be
done simply by adopting the capability approach, and this should be kept in mind
when applying Sen’s framework.
Moreover, notice that the capability approach does not provide us with any for-
mula on how to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being. For that purpose, we
have to make further statements about how to compare different bundles of function-
6See Rawls (1971, 1993). I discuss the Rawlsian perspective in more detail in Tungodden (1996,
1999).
7This might seem like a reasonable move. However, it has been contested by among others
Rawls (1993), who argues that any political conception of justice should refer to an idea of rational
advantage that is independent of any particular comprehensive account of the good. Rawls does
not reject the possibility that betterness should be evaluated in the capability space, but defends
a focus on instrumental aspects (like income) if justice is the subject of our problem. For a further
discussion of this issue, see Brun and Tungodden (2000).
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ings for different people with different preferences. This is definitely a hard problem,
which is not solved simply by adopting the capability approach. Sen stresses that
‘the capability perspective is inescapably pluralist’ (p. 76). It allows for a number of
possible interpretations, and therefore makes explicit the valuational exercise needed
in order to reach a conclusion in any particular case. And he views this as one of
the main merits of the capability approach, which should be contrasted with for
example the use of an implicit metric in the income approach. The implicit metric
of the income approach is market prices, and Sen is worried about the seemingly
common assumption that this is ‘an “already available” metric that the society can
immediately use without further ado’ (p. 80). Sen is rightly pointing out the fact
that the use of market prices also needs to be defended, and the appropriateness of
this metric will depend on the purpose of the evaluative exercise. If our concern is
to attain a measure of a person’s freedom to choose different combinations of com-
modities available in the market, then market prices is a good guide. But beyond
that, we should apply these prices with care.
In conclusion, I think it is correct to say that the main contribution of the ca-
pability approach is to establish a reasonable ‘framework of thought, a mode of
thinking’ (Robeyns, 2000, p. 3) on the ends of development. The capability ap-
proach does not provide us with any formula on how to establish conclusions on the
individual or the aggregate level, but forces us more generally to direct ourselves
to the aspects that are constitutive of people’s being when evaluating development
processes (p. 286). It turns out that this move can be of much importance. In Devel-
opment as Freedom, Sen illustrates this by considering (among other things) gender
inequality. The simple and clear message provided by the capability approach is to
move beyond an evaluation of these phenomena in any narrow term (like income or
hedonism) and work with the real reasons for our worries. We cannot fully express
our concern for gender inequality in Asia and North Africa by looking at income
statistics, but need to consider demographic, medical and social information as well.
And one of the most important practical contributions of the capability approach
was Sen’s paper ‘Missing Women’ in British Medical Journal in 1992, where he used
female-male ratios in different countries to point out that more than 100 million
women may be seen as ‘missing’ in these countries (that is, ‘missing’ in the sense
of being dead as a result of gender bias). This aspect of the development process
would not easily be captured by any other mode of thinking, I would say, and shows
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the essential importance of evaluating and expressing the development process in
the language of the capability approach. Similarly, Sen illustrates in Development as
Freedom the usefulness of the capability perspective when comparing for example
the situation of American blacks with the life of low income Indians in Kerala (p.
22) and when trying to grasp the nature of deprivation and poverty in India and
sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 101-103).
However, notice that Sen is not at all rejecting the practical importance of the
income approach. Even though the capability approach has merits compared with
income on the foundational level, Sen certainly acknowledges that income often is
the major cause of capability deprivations and hence that, in studying poverty, ‘there
is an excellent argument for beginning with whatever information we have on the
distribution of income, particularly low real incomes’ (p. 72). Moreover, Sen stresses
that ‘[s]ome capabilities are harder to measure than others, and attempts at putting
them on a ‘metric’ may sometimes hide more than they reveal’ (p. 81).
Even though all this seems reasonable, we might want to move beyond using the
capability approach only as a mode of thinking and seek more precise conclusions
within this framework. For this purpose, we need to select weights both at the
individual level and aggregate level, and it is of much interest to notice how Sen
wants us to proceed in this respect.
‘However, in arriving at an “agreed” range of social evaluation (for
example, in social studies of poverty), there has to be some kind of rea-
soned ‘consensus’ on weights, or at least on a range of weights. This is a
‘social choice’ exercise, and it requires public discussion and a democratic
understanding and acceptance...There is an interesting choice between
‘technocracy’ and ‘democracy’ in the selection of weights, which may be
worth discussing a little. A choice procedure that relies on a democratic
search for agreement or consensus can be extremely messy, and many
technocrats are sufficiently disgusted by its messiness to pine for some
wonderful formula that would simply give us ready-made weights that
are ‘just right’. However, no such magic formula does, of course, exist,
since the issue of weighting is one of valuation and judgment, and not
one of some impersonal technology’ (pp. 78-79).
Sen views democratic reasoning as the constructive vehicle for reaching conclu-
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sions within the capability approach, and he makes the methodological case ‘for
emphasizing the need to assign explicitly evaluative weights to different components
of life (or of well-being) and then to place the chosen weights for open public dis-
cussion and critical scrutiny’ (p. 81).
In this respect, it is of some interest to evaluate the construction of human
development indices by UNDP (1990-2000), which has been considered ‘one of the
best illustrations of the usefulness of the capability approach’ (Robeyns, 2000, p.
23). These indices are formulas that assign specific weights to different components
of life (in the case of the Human Development Index (HDI), it takes into account
health, education, and income), and thus the Senian methodology demands open
public discussion and critical scrutiny of the choice of criteria in order to make such
an index useful. To my knowledge, this has not happened. People have suggested
that the indices should be broadened and incorporate other aspects of life as well (see
for example Dasgupta, 1993), but there has been as far as I know no open public
discussion on the reasonableness of the relative weights assigned to the different
dimensions of these indices.
It is easy to see why in the case of for example HDI. Even though it is certainly
possible to calculate the implicit weights in this index, this is far from easy work. It
is rather straightforward to find the implicit weights assigned to aggregate partial
indices in HDI, and that is the kind of information presented in the annual reports
of UNDP. ‘The HDI is a simple average of the life expectancy index, educational at-
tainment index and adjusted GDP per capita’ (UNDP, 2000, p. 269). But in general
I find it hard to do a meaningful valuational exercise at this level of analysis. In order
to say how to make a (possible) trade-off between, say, an increase in life expectancy
and economic growth, we have to pose the question at a more fundamental level.
Let me explain. By combining life expectancy and GDP in an aggregate index, we
assign a particular economic value to a human life, and it is the reasonableness of
this value that should be determined by democratic reasoning. However, it is rather
demanding to calculate the implicit value assigned to a human life in HDI for any
specific country, and as a result the relevant weights have not been made explicit in
public debates as demanded by Sen’s methodology.
This is not to say that the human development project of UNDP has not broad-
ened our understanding of development. It has, and maybe the indices have been a
necessary political instrument for this purpose. Sen certainly seems to think so.
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‘These aggregate indices have tended to draw much more public at-
tention than the detailed and diverse empirical pictures emerging from
the tables and other empirical presentations. Indeed, getting public at-
tention has clearly been a part of UNDP’s objective, particularly in its
attempt to combat the overconcentration on the simple measure of GNP
per head, which often serves as the only indicator of which public take
any notice. To compete with the GNP, there is a need for another -
broader - measure with the same level of crudeness as the GNP’ (p.
318).
Be that as it may. In my view, these indices have not contributed to the process
of social evaluation suggested more generally by Sen, where the outcome is a result
of an open public discussion and critical scrutiny. And I think it is unfortunate
that many people have endorsed the suggested human development indices only
because they represent a step away from narrow economic indicators. In order to
see whether these indices actually work better than GNP (or maybe a distributive
sensitive aggregate income measure), we would have to evaluative the reasonableness
of the implicit weights. Of course, we can immediately agree that a broader index
is better in cases where there is no conflict between the different dimensions (if we
accept that all dimensions are valuable), but I guess the interesting cases are when
we experience a conflict. And then it is far from obvious that we always should
endorse the conclusions of the broader index. It all depends on the reasonableness
of the weights.
There is another problem with HDI as well, and that is that it might give the
impression of a need for exact conclusions when evaluating development processes.
The index provides a precise ranking of all countries, and we may wonder whether
such a fine-tuned approach is really necessary when working with the most pressing
problems in the world of today. According to Sen, it is not.
‘It is also important to recognize that agreed social arrangements and
adequate public policies do not require that there be a unique “social
ordering” that completely ranks all the alternative social possibilities.
Partial agreements still separate out acceptable options (and weed out
unacceptable ones), and a workable solution can be based on the contin-
gent acceptance of particular provisions, without demanding complete
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social unanimity.
It can also be argued that judgments of “social justice” do not re-
ally call for a tremendous fine-tuning precision: such a claim that a tax
rate of 39.0 percent is just, whereas 39.6 would not be (or even that the
former is “more just than” the latter). Rather, what is needed is a work-
ing agreement on some basic matters of identifiably intense injustice or
unfairness.
Indeed, the insistence on the completeness of judgments of justice
over every possible choice is not only an enemy of practical social action,
it may also reflect some misunderstanding of the nature of justice itself.
To take an extreme example, in agreeing that the occurrence of a pre-
ventable famine is socially unjust, we do not also lay claim to an ability
to determine what exact allocation of food among all the citizens will
be “most just”. The recognition of evident injustice in preventable de-
privation, such as widespread hunger, unnecessary morbidity, premature
mortality, grinding poverty, neglect of female children, subjugation of
women, and phenomena of that kind does not have to await the deriva-
tion of some complete ordering over choices that involve finer differences
and puny infelicities. Indeed, the overuse of the concept of justice re-
duces the forces of the idea when applied to terrible deprivations and
inequities that characterise the world in which we live. Justice is like a
cannon, and it need not be fired (as an old Bengali proverb puts it) to
kill a mosquito’ (pp. 253-254).
Hence, as I see it, HDI and like indices are also in this respect in some conflict
with Sen’s more general methodology, and thus we might wonder whether it is a
good strategy to introduce them in the debate (even though they may contribute to
attract public attention to an important broadening of the development perspective).
Let me close this section by some further comments on the link between Sen’s
approach and democratic reasoning. It should by now be clear that Sen views demo-
cratic reasoning as a prerequisite for any conclusion on valuational exercises. This
should not be misunderstood as saying that there is no need for suggestions by
‘technocrats’ on this issue. The point is simply that the status of any particular
view must depend on its acceptability to others (p. 79). But we might still wonder
whether Sen attaches too much importance to democracy, in particular in light of
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cultural differences. Is Sen imposing a Western way of doing things?
Sen strongly defends democracy as a universal value, and he actually considers
the rise of democracy the most important thing that happened in the twentieth
century (Sen, 1999b). Moreover he rejects the conventional monolithic interpretation
of Asian values as hostile to democracy and political rights. He shows that this is
based on a too narrow understanding of Asian values, and in his characteristically
illuminating way illustrates the need for a nuanced interpretation of Confucianism,
Islamic, and Indian thinking. Within all these cultures, important authors have
expressed the need for political and religious tolerance, freedom, and diversity. In
conclusion, he rejects the view that there is a need to abandon democracy as a
universal value because there exist authoritarian writings within the Asian tradition.
‘It is not hard, of course, to find authoritarian writings within the
Asian traditions. But neither is it hard to find them in the Western
classics: One has only to reflect on the writings of Plato or Aquinas to
see that devotion to discipline is not a special Asian taste. To dismiss the
plausibility of democracy as a universal value because of the presence of
some Asian writings on discipline and order would be similar to rejecting
the plausibility of democracy as a natural form of government in Europe
and America today on the basis of the writings of Plato or Aquinas
(not to mention the substantial medieval literature in support of the
Inquisitions)’ (Sen, 1999b, p. 15).
Notice that Sen not only values democracy on the basis of the constructive role
he thinks it should play when making social evaluations, but also because he sees the
political and social participation realised by democratic institutions as valuable in
itself for people. Still I believe that the constructive part is of particular importance
in the Senian framework, as can be illustrated by considering somewhat further the
way he deals with the possible causal link between democracy and economic growth.
Sen does not accept the empirical claim that authoritarian regimes seem to foster
more growth, but at the same time he argues that ‘this way of posing the question
tends to miss the important understanding that these substantive freedoms...are
among the constituent components of development. Their relevance for development
does not have to be freshly established through their indirect contribution to the
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growth of GNP’ (p. 5). It is not hard to agree with that, but we might still won-
der whether we should accept a trade-off between the economic dimension and the
political dimension if it turns out (contrary to what Sen believes) that authoritar-
ian regimes actually contribute more effectively in the economic dimension.8 Within
Sen’s framework, however this would be an ill-posed problem, because the choice of
any such trade-off is a valuational exercise that need to be established by democratic
reasoning.
In sum, the main message of the capability approach is that the normative basis
of development should deal with what is intrinsically valuable for people - human
freedom - and by insisting on this Sen has forced the debate to take into account
a much broader spectrum of problems than what has frequently been dealt with in
welfare economics and development analysis more generally. Of course, many of the
topics raised by Sen have been suggested by others as well on different occasions, but
by introducing an organising concept like human freedom Sen has moved consider-
ations on civil and political rights, social exclusion, intrahousehold discrimination,
gender inequality, mortality and morbidity rates, and so on to the center of the stage
of the development discussion. Beyond that, the approach does not offer us evalua-
tive conclusions, which Sen leaves to the democratic debate to establish. However,
by recognising the diversity of components constituting human freedom, Sen has
also made us aware of the fact that the set of solutions to development problems
is much broader then frequently conceived, and we now turn to a discussion of this
issue.
4 Individual freedom as the principal means of
development
Economists consider competitive markets instrumentally valuable, because they of-
ten contribute to a Pareto efficient allocation of goods in society. But no economist
would immediately accept that competitive markets guarantee a just or good allo-
cation. An allocation of resources might be Pareto efficient even if some people do
8This question has been a central issue more broadly within political philosohopy, as a response
to the framework of Rawls (1971) where political freedom is assigned absolute priority. Rawls
(1993) provides a response to this criticisim.
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not survive in a world of plenty, because to allow for more survival would require
sacrifices from some of those who are fortunate enough to be able to survive any-
way (see Cole and Hammond (1995) for a formal discussion of these extreme cases).
Hence, it is obvious that the invisible hand of Adam Smith does not deal with the
problem of redistribution in a sufficient manner, and thus economists have for a long
time studied possible ways of redistributing income. In addition, economists have
recognised and extensively studied the presence of both market failures (with respect
to efficiency) and government failures (with respect to interventions), and hence I
think it is fair to say that the economic profession in general have a rather nuanced
picture of many of the fundamental institutional problems facing societies in the
modern world. So what does Sen add to this picture in Development as Freedom?
First of all, it is important to notice that Sen does not at all reject the standard
economic argument in favour of the market mechanism. Actually, Sen points out
that the well-known Arrow-Debreu efficiency result translates from the “space” of
utilities to that of individual freedoms.9
‘[I]t turns out that for a cogent characterisation of individual free-
doms, a competitive market equilibrium guarantees that no one’s free-
dom can be increased any further while maintaining the freedom of any
one else’ (p. 117).
However, within the freedom perspective of Sen, this efficiency argument is only
part of the story. The more immediate argument in favour of the market system is
that it represents a basic freedom of people, as also was pointed out a long time ago
by Adam Smith.
‘As Adam Smith noted, freedom of exchange and transaction is itself
part and parcel of the basic liberties that people have reason to value.
To be generically against markets would be almost as odd as being
generically against conversations between people (even though some con-
versations are clearly foul and cause problems for others-or even for the
conversationalists themselves). The freedom to exchange words, or goods,
or gifts does not need defensive justification in terms of the favourable
but distant effects; they are part of the way human beings in society live
9This is formally established in Sen (1993).
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and interact with each other (unless stopped by regulation or fiat). The
contribution of the market mechanism to economic growth is, of course,
important, but this comes only after the direct significance of the free-
dom to interchange - words, goods, gifts - has been acknowledged’ (p.
6).
In other words, Sen’s reasoning is not at all against the use of the market mech-
anism. On the contrary, Sen stresses the fact that the freedom to enter markets can
itself be an important contribution to development, as in the presence of bonded
labour, the denial of women’s opportunity to seek employment outside the family,
and so on.
Of course, Sen underlines the need for a critical scrutiny of the role of the market
in different circumstances, but this is very much in line with the standard view of
modern economics.10 Where Sen differs from much of conventional economics is that
he embraces a broader set of nonmarket institutions as important for development.
Sen considers five types of freedoms essential for development: political free-
doms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protec-
tive security. And he argues that there are empirical interconnections between these
freedoms that make the expansion of individual freedom the principle means of de-
velopment (p. 4). In other words, individual freedom in one valuable dimension is not
only of constitutive importance, but might also be an engine of further development
because it often contributes to more individual freedom in other valuable dimen-
sions. Of course, in some cases we might experience a conflict between the freedoms
of different people, and then we need a further valuational exercise in order to make
a definite evaluative conclusion. But when exploring the empirical interconnections
in Development as Freedom, Sen is not particularly concerned with this issue, either
because he assumes that everyone gains from a particular interconnection or because
he deals with a conflict where he thinks it is obvious what is the right step forward.
I doubt that many people will disagree with the general claim that there are
empirical interconnections between the different dimensions of freedom outlined by
Sen. Hence, in order to see the value of his reasoning in this respect and how it has
broadened our thinking on development issues, there is a need for looking at partic-
10Also in this respect, Sen relates his work to the views of Adam Smith, who neither hesitated
to propose restrictions in order to regulate the market (p. 124).
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ular interconnections explored in Sen’s work. In my view, the most important link
enlightened by Sen is between political freedom and protective security in famine sit-
uations.11 Markets and nature play fundamental roles during famines (as illustrated
by the studies of both Sen (1981) and Ravallion (1987)), but Sen has also shown
us the need for a much broader understanding of the causes of famine. In particu-
lar, Sen has stressed the empirical observation that ‘no substantial famine has ever
occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a
relatively free press’ (p. 152). According to Sen, there are two main reasons for this.
First, democracy provides the political incentives to try to prevent any threatening
famine, and second a free press contributes to establish the relevant information for
famine prevention.
The fact that political freedom may enhance economic freedom for the poor is
of course not news within political economy, and the key role of the media in in-
forming the electorate has been recognised for a long time within political science.
Hence, the most important part of Sen’s contribution in this respect is the precise
empirical content of his argument, and the fact that this observation - as an early
contribution to modern political economy - made economists and other social scien-
tists again aware of the need for broadening their analyses of famines in particular
and distributive issues more generally. This message has been taken by much recent
work within political economy, even though little attention is still paid to the ex-
act link between the role of news media in influencing policy (an exception being
the interesting study of government responsiveness in India by Besley and Burgess
(2000)).
Another important interconnection explored by Sen is the link between the free-
dom of women (in different dimensions) and development. We have already men-
tioned the importance of studying gender inequality from the capability perspective
in order to capture the enormous inequalities in well-being between males and fe-
males in some countries. But Sen is also concerned with another aspect of women’s
situation, to wit women as ‘dynamic promoters of social transformation that can
alter the lives of both women and men’ (p. 189). In order to analyse this, Sen makes
the distinction between the well-being aspect and the agency aspect of a person,
where the agency role recognizes people as responsible: ‘not only are we well or ill,
but also we act or refuse to act, and can choose to act one way rather than another’
11An extensive account of this work can be found in Sen (1981) and Dre`ze and Sen (1989).
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(p. 190).12
In Development as Freedom, Sen discusses a number of different implications
following from adding voice to women’s voice and agency. Let me provide some
examples. First, he points at the rather immediate interconnections between different
dimensions of a woman’s freedom, as for example how the ability to find employment
outside home and ownership rights may enhance the social standing of a woman
in the household and the society. Second, he stresses how women’s empowerment
tend to reduce mortality rates, gender bias among children, and fertility rates. And
third, he argues that there are interesting statistical findings indicating that women’s
participation in social life might reduce the presence of violent crimes in society. In
sum, he argues that ‘[t]he extensive reach of women’s agency is one of the more
neglected areas of development studies, and most urgently in need of correction.
Nothing, arguably, is as important today in the political economy of development as
an adequate recognition of political, economic and social participation and leadership
of women. This is indeed a crucial aspect of “development as freedom”’ (p. 203).
There is no doubt that Sen’s work on women’s situation has been an extremely
vital correction to the conventional thinking on development, as the vast literature
initiated by his thinking on these issues also proves. But it is also important to
recognize that many of the agency aspects analysed by Sen can be fruitfully explored
within the framework of modern economic theory. The literature studying gender
divisions within the family as a ‘bargaining problem’ is a case in point, as is the
statistical study of Murthi, Guio, and Dre`ze (1995) discussed extensively by Sen.
This is not to say that everything of interest on women’s agency can be captured
by economic reasoning. For example, economic theory is not well suited to deal with
how women’s agency influence value formation within the family and in society
more generally, and hence there is undoubtedly a need for a many-sided approach to
this crucial issue. Within this broader framework, though, I believe that economic
reasoning will play an essential role in explaining how the empowerment of women
will contribute to development.
Sen discusses a number of other interesting empirical interconnections in De-
velopment as Freedom. He looks at how social opportunity has enhanced economic
development in parts of East Asia, how essential interconnections between literacy,
12For an extensive general discussion of the underlying philosophical distinction between these
two aspects, see Sen (1985).
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health, and land distribution have established protective security in Kerala, how the
absence of transparency freedom played an essential role in the emergence of the
Asian financial crisis, and so on. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider all
the contributions of Sen, and hence I should like to end this section by considering
another main message that Sen sees emerging from his empirical work. By under-
standing the broad set of interconnections between different individual freedoms,
which are established and shaped by the choice of institutions in society, he argues
that there is a strong need for an integrated approach to development analysis.
‘To see development as freedom provides a perspective in which in-
stitutional assessment can systematically occur.
Even though different commentators have chosen to focus on par-
ticular institutions (such as the market, or the democratic system, or
the media, or the public distribution system), we have to view them to-
gether, to be able to see what they can or cannot do in combination with
other institutions. It is in this integrated perspective that the different
institutions can be reasonably assessed and examined’ (p. 142).
It is undoubtedly important to have in mind the need for an integrated view when
studying the organization of society, but we should also be aware of the problem
of this approach as a framework for research. By trying to capture ‘everything’, we
might find it hard to establish precisely anything. Of course, Sen has for a long time
stressed (more generally) that it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong
(see for example Sen, 1987, p. 34). True enough, but it is also much better to be
(if possible) precisely right than vaguely wrong. And that is why economists often
choose to narrow their framework. By considering a piece of the overall problem, we
might be able to draw some firm conclusions and reject some initial vague thoughts.
In doing this, we may easily forget the need for interpreting our results in a broader
integrated context, and Sen’s message is important in that respect. But the piecemeal
approach to research (which of course Sen has followed on many occasions) has also
advantages that should be taken into account when doing development analysis.
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5 Concluding remarks
Sen has a vision of how modern science can be used to overcome the many challenges
facing the modern world of today, and this vision is beautifully outlined in Devel-
opment as Freedom. Sen believes in reasoned social progress, where our choices are
based on reasons that identify and promote better and more acceptable societies. He
suggests that the concept of human freedom should be the organizing principle of
such an approach, and illustrates how this framework can improve the development
debate in many important ways.
Economists have a lot to learn from Sen’s vision. But as an economist I should
also like to stress the importance of recognising that economic theory and economic
research is an essential part of Sen’s framework. Sen has broadened our understand-
ing of how to do descriptive, positive and normative analysis, and by doing this he
has enriched - but not at all abandoned - economics. He has also shown economists
the importance of an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to development. But
I believe that it is equally important that non-economists pursue the many contri-
butions within economics underlying the discussion in Development as Freedom. It
is only by a broad recognition of the importance of interdisciplinary reasoning that
we can really recognize the value of considering development as the expansion of
human freedom.
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